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ABSTRACT 
 
The world’s scientific community must be in a state of constant readiness to address the 
threat posed by newly emerging infectious diseases. Whether the disease in question is 
SARS in humans or BSE in animals, scientists must be able to put into action various 
disease containment measures when everything from the causative pathogen to route(s) 
of transmission is essentially uncertain. A robust epistemic framework, which will inform 
decision-making, is required under such conditions of uncertainty. I will argue that this 
framework should have reasoning at its centre and, specifically, that forms of reasoning 
beyond deduction and induction should be countenanced by scientists who are confronted 
with emerging infectious diseases. In previous articles, I have presented a case for 
treating certain so-called traditional informal fallacies as rationally acceptable forms of 
argument that can facilitate scientific inquiry when little is known about an emerging 
disease. In this paper, I want to extend that analysis by highlighting the unique features of 
these arguments that makes them specially adapted to cope with conditions of 
uncertainty. Of course, such a view of the informal fallacies must at least be consistent 
with the reasoning practices of scientists, and particularly those scientists (viz. 
epidemiologists) whose task it is to track and respond to newly emerging infectious 
diseases. To this end, I draw upon examples of scientific reasoning from the UK’s BSE 
crisis, a crisis that posed a significant threat to both human and animal health. 
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1. EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND UNCERTAINTY 
Emerging infectious diseases present public health scientists with a uniquely difficult 
challenge. These diseases pose a potentially serious threat to the health of both human 
and animal populations, a threat that demands action from these scientists. Yet, this 
action must often be undertaken in conditions that are characterized by a pervasive lack 
of knowledge. Recent human and animal epidemics provide clear examples of the 
uncertainty and ignorance that attend the emergence of new diseases. In 2000, an inquiry 
into the UK’s BSE crisis1 revealed something of the extent of this uncertainty and lack of 
knowledge. Mr Cruickshank of the Animal Health Group in the UK’s Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food remarked that ‘[w]e do not know where this disease 
came from, we do not know how it is spread and we do not know whether it can be 
passed to humans’ (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 1: 44). Even more recently, global 
scientific uncertainty has been strikingly evident in the case of the emergence of severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Lingappa et al. (2004) stated that in March 2003, 
when the global health community first became aware of the emergence of SARS: 
 
[T]he international health community faced a potential pandemic for which 
there were no identified causal agent, no diagnostic laboratory assays, no 
defined properties or risk factors for transmission, no infection-control 
practices of proven efficacy, and no known treatment or prevention measures 
(167). 
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The BSE and SARS epidemics were eventually contained.2 However, these outbreaks of 
infectious disease, and others like them, have occasioned reflection on the part of 
investigators about how uncertainty may best be tackled in future epidemics.3 Nowhere is 
the need for such reflection more pronounced than in epidemiology, the branch of science 
that is responsible for detecting and monitoring the emergence of new infectious diseases. 
While mathematical modelling of epidemics is commonplace in epidemiology, the modes 
of reasoning that are integral to these models are construed along strictly deductive-
inductive lines.4 A reorientation away from deductive and inductive modes of reasoning 
towards presumptive frameworks is central to the view of scientific reasoning that I will 
discuss in this paper (and may even assist scientists as they engage in reflection of how 
epidemiology may best respond to uncertainty5). Specifically, I will argue that the 
presumptive character of certain informal fallacies makes them ideally suited to the task 
of advancing scientific inquiry in contexts of uncertainty. It is to an examination of these 
fallacies and their role in scientific reasoning that we now turn.  
 
2. INFORMAL FALLACIES AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 
The history of the informal fallacies has been an interesting one to say the least. Since 
Aristotle first examined the fallacies in Sophistical Refutations, and with the exception of 
contributions from medieval logicians and theorists such as Sidgwick, Whately and Mill, 
the fallacies languished in a state of almost total neglect until the latter part of the 
twentieth century. In 1970, Charles Hamblin’s book Fallacies reversed the fortune of this 
branch of logical inquiry in a way that is still being felt to the present day. Specifically, 
Hamblin was concerned to challenge the so-called standard treatment of the fallacies that 
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was found in logic textbooks.6 His own analysis of the fallacies emphasized the use of 
dialectical structures for the normative evaluation of arguments, a point that had been 
largely overlooked in the study of fallacies but which had been central to Aristotle’s 
original account. Hamblin’s dialectical framework was significant in the following 
respect. It spawned a number of studies that were to describe how variants of the informal 
fallacies were nonfallacious in particular contexts of use. In a study of nonfallacious 
arguments from ignorance, for example, Walton (1992) directly attributes the 
presumptive framework that is the basis of his analysis to Hamblin’s formal dialectic: 
 
This analysis of presumption clearly itself presumes the existence of a 
dialectical framework for the evaluation of arguments where two parties 
“reason together”. But such a framework is given in the outline of formal 
dialectic presented by Hamblin (1970)… (Walton 1992: 383). 
 
Steadily, one informal fallacy after another was shown to have nonfallacious variants. By 
far the most significant contributors to this area of fallacy theory have been John Woods 
and Douglas Walton. In a large number of books and journal articles, these theorists 
described nonfallacious forms of petitio principii (begging the question), argumentum ad 
ignorantiam (the argument from ignorance), and argumentum ad baculum (the argument 
from the stick or appeal to force), amongst others (Walton 1985, 1992; Woods 1995). 
Informal fallacies were now experiencing an intellectual renaissance that had not been 
witnessed in many earlier centuries of inquiry in logic. As more and more theorists turned 
their attention to the rational and epistemic features of the informal fallacies, it became 
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clear that these arguments, and the presumptive frameworks that licensed them, had 
applications in domains where deductive and inductive modes of reasoning had 
previously dominated. One such domain was scientific inquiry. In this way, in Cummings 
(2000, 2002, 2004) I described how nonfallacious forms of three informal fallacies – 
petitio principii, arguments from analogy and argumentum ad ignorantiam – functioned 
as reasoning heuristics that facilitate the progress of scientific inquiry under conditions of 
epistemic uncertainty. How surprising this new found status of the fallacies would have 
appeared to the logicians of earlier centuries.7   
 
Some consideration of informal fallacies and presumptive frameworks in general reveals 
why these arguments are well suited to the analysis of reasoning within scientific 
contexts. Presumption is a rather tentative epistemic category. It contains a commitment 
to a thesis that is of an altogether weaker nature than either knowledge or belief, for 
example.8 This commitment can be easily eroded in the presence of countervailing 
conditions. So an agent may presume that p, but relinquish commitment to p as soon as 
conditions give the slightest indication to reject p. The tentative, provisional nature of 
presumption is described by Rescher as follows: 
 
[A] presumption is a plausible pretender to truth whose credentials may well 
prove insufficient, a runner in a race it may not win. The “acceptance” of a 
proposition as a merely presumptive truth is not acceptance at all but a highly 
provisional and conditional epistemic inclination toward it, an inclination that 
falls far short of outright commitment (2006: 3).  
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 These features of presumption mean that this epistemic concept is particularly well suited 
to an analysis of reasoning in the context of scientific inquiry in at least three respects. 
Firstly, the fallible nature of scientific inquiry demands that our various epistemic 
concepts must be able to withstand error and failure. Moreover, the fact of the occurrence 
of error should not erode our confidence in those concepts which deliver truths to us on 
enough occasions for us to continue to operate by them. Presumption, it seems, is the 
ideal epistemic candidate for such a fallible process of scientific inquiry: 
 
Their inherent defeasibility means that appropriate presumptions are 
impervious to occasional failure (Rescher 2006: 7).  
 
Secondly, many scientific inquiries are conducted under conditions of extreme urgency 
and uncertainty. Where the health of the public is at risk, as is the case in a newly 
emerging infectious disease, urgency and uncertainty become uneasy bedfellows. In order 
to maximize the urgency of a scientific response to an epidemic, scientists are often 
compelled to institute disease containment measures using knowledge bases that are 
incomplete and uncertain. We saw in section 1, for example, how scientists investigating 
SARS and BSE lacked knowledge of all key aspects of the epidemics that confronted 
them (types of pathogen, route(s) of transmission, etc.). However, if the implementation 
of containment measures must await the development of certain knowledge bases, the 
urgency of a scientific response will be compromised with possible devastating 
consequences for the health of a population.  Presumption is the epistemic concept that 
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enables scientists to balance the practical demands of disease containment against the 
theoretical requirement for complete and certain knowledge. For it is presumption that 
licenses decisions of the practical sphere when complete and certain knowledge is beyond 
the immediate grasp of scientists: 
 
[P]resumption is certainly not knowledge: we do not know what we merely 
presume to be so. As an informative resource its standing is quite different 
from that of knowledge… [presumption] nevertheless is an informative 
resource – and a highly useful one at that, since it serves to close up an 
otherwise debilitating gap (Rescher 2006: 6; italics in original).  
 
Thirdly, in yielding to considerations that are more plausible, presumptions are 
inextricably linked to the standards and types of evidence that apply in a particular 
domain. The evidence that is required to defeat a presumption varies on the basis of 
context-specific considerations such as the importance of the question at issue.9 For 
example, one might reasonably expect scientists who are testing a new drug for use in 
humans to have to meet a very high burden of proof before such a drug can be licensed. 
In such a case, the precautionary principle10 requires that there is a presumption against 
the safety of the new drug which extensive clinical trials must seek to overcome. As more 
and more trials are conducted and no adverse health effects of the drug are observed, the 
presumption shifts in favour of the safety of the new drug. Long-standing presumptions 
grow in epistemic stature as they are ‘retrospectively validated’ by inquiry.11 This 
capacity of presumptions to improve their epistemic standing is the direct result of the 
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dialectical to and fro that occurs between presumption and burden of proof in scientific 
inquiry. Where this dialectical exchange does not occur, or is otherwise subverted, it is 
usually to the detriment of scientific inquiry. We will see subsequently how a 
presumption in support of the non-transmissibility of BSE to humans became ‘fossilized’ 
in the BSE inquiry with quite disastrous consequences for human health. 
 
These three features of presumption are significant in the following respect: they are 
integral to the view of the informal fallacies that I am espousing in this paper, a view in 
which these fallacies facilitate scientific inquiry under conditions of uncertainty. To 
demonstrate this claim, I will draw on two earlier analyses of fallacies in Cummings 
(2002, 2004). However, where those earlier analyses described the logical features and 
functions of the fallacies in question, there was little consideration of their presumptive 
character. That presumptive character, I will argue, is what makes the fallacies ideally 
suited to the rational methodology of science. 
 
2.1 Scientific Error and the Informal Fallacies 
The reason logicians are so quick to legislate against the fallacies is that they are 
standardly taken to lead us into error.12 Error is an interesting concept which has hidden 
dimensions that have relevance for the account of fallacies that I am developing in the 
present context. One of those dimensions is the persistence of error. Notwithstanding our 
best efforts to minimize and even eliminate errors, they are a persistent feature of our 
various cognitive deliberations.13 The persistence of error in the form of fallacies is 
remarked upon by John Woods. Woods is struck by the recurrence of certain fallacies 
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(the so-called ‘gang of eighteen’14) in the literature. His explanation of their recurrence 
‘generation-in and generation-out’ is revealing of the status that Woods affords to the 
fallacies: 
 
[T]he standard examples caricature (because they over-simplify) 
improprieties of rational performance of which they themselves can be 
considered a kind of idealized symptom. Those misperformances in turn are 
failures of one or another of our basic rational survival skills (2004: 10-11). 
 
Woods clearly links the persistence of the fallacies to the role they play in our cognitive 
rationality. I agree with this view in part – fallacies have a much closer connection to our 
cognitive rationality than logicians have typically acknowledged. But I think Woods 
tends to follow other logicians in presenting a rather negative case against the fallacies. 
Quite apart from being ‘improprieties of rational performance’, the fallacies, I contend, 
are a core component of our rational competence. Of course, on occasion, they let us 
down – we can make errors based on the particular cognitive directions in which they 
lead us. But these errors do little damage to the rational standing of the argument forms in 
question. This is because presumption is the very essence of these argument forms and, 
like presumption, these forms are ‘impervious to occasional failure’. This is amply 
demonstrated by two informal fallacies – the argument from ignorance and the argument 
from analogy – which played a key role in the reasoning of BSE scientists. The argument 
from ignorance was used so extensively during the BSE crisis in the UK that the public 
inquiry15 that was set up to investigate the handling of the epidemic labeled it as the 
‘mantra’ of the BSE story. Although different forms of the argument were used, it was 
 10
Po
t-Print
most commonly employed in relation to the question of the transmissibility of BSE to 
humans. In this way, Dr Calman (Chief Medical Officer, 1991-1998) released a statement 
on 26 January 1994 in which he stated: 
 
[O]n the basis of the work done so far, there was no evidence whatever that 
BSE caused CJD and, similarly, not the slightest evidence that eating beef or 
hamburgers caused CJD (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 1: 143; italics added). 
 
On 7 December 1995, Dr Robert Kendell (Chief Medical Officer for Scotland, 1991-
1996) made a public statement in which he claimed ‘[w]e have no evidence of any 
connection between BSE and CJD’ (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 1: 150; italics added). 
In a letter to the Chief Medical Officer dated 24 July 1990, the Spongiform 
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC)16 concluded that: 
 
[W]e believe that there is no scientific justification for not eating British beef 
and that it can be eaten by everyone (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 1: 131; 
italics added). 
 
These repeated claims by scientists17 that there was ‘no evidence’ that BSE caused CJD 
in humans and that there was ‘no scientific justification’ for not eating British beef had 
the effect of persuading an anxious public that BSE was not transmissible to humans. The 
vehicle of this persuasion was a classic argument from ignorance18 which can be 
reconstructed as follows: 
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                       There is no evidence that BSE in cattle causes CJD in humans. 
                  ∴ BSE in cattle does not cause CJD in humans.   
 
That BSE would not transmit to humans was also the conclusion of a second argument 
form that was used extensively by BSE scientists. This was the argument from analogy, 
where scientists used purported similarities of BSE with scrapie disease in sheep to argue 
that BSE would not transmit to humans. Analogical reasoning was integral to the 
deliberations of the Southwood Working Party:19 
 
The conclusion that BSE would behave in the same way as scrapie was 
essentially a matter of judgement in the face of uncertainties, or an ‘educated 
guess’. This was not something that the Working Party sought to conceal, as 
is clear from private correspondence which Sir Richard had with a number of 
scientists about BSE. In a letter to a Mr J Granger (a veterinary surgeon) on 
25 October 1988, Sir Richard wrote: I have to say that it is my view that the 
risk of transmission of BSE to man is relatively small, but this view is based 
entirely on drawing a parallel with scrapie…(BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 4: 
47). 
 
The analogical argument20 that was central to the reasoning of the Southwood Working 
Party can be reconstructed as follows: 
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                         BSE is similar to scrapie in certain respects. 
                         Scrapie has not transmitted to humans. 
                     ∴ BSE will not transmit to humans. 
 
Of course, we now know that the conclusions of these ignorance and analogical 
arguments were erroneous. BSE did indeed transmit to humans and cause CJD, a fact that 
was acknowledged for the first time on 20 March 1996 when Mr Stephen Dorrell, the 
then Secretary of State for Health, announced the emergence of new variant CJD to 
British Parliament. That these conclusions were ultimately shown to be erroneous did 
nothing to invalidate the initial legitimacy of the presumptive reasoning strategies that led 
to these conclusions. The ultimate defeat of specific presumptive conclusions in inquiry 
is in no way remarkable. Presumption is, after all, a highly tentative epistemic category 
that should be rejected as soon as countervailing conditions emerge.21 Moreover, the 
failure of one presumption in inquiry is not grounds for the rejection of presumptions in 
toto. The inherent defeasibility of presumptions is what makes this epistemic concept 
able to accommodate scientific error and to respond to such error in a way that does not 
involve the wider destruction of scientific inquiry. This is evident in the piecemeal 
fashion in which presumptive conclusions were rejected during the BSE inquiry as 
evidence from other sources became available. In this way, analogies with scrapie were 
used to guide decision-making on a whole range of issues beyond the question of the 
transmission of BSE to humans. One such issue was the cattle tissues to include in the 
Specified Bovine Offal (SBO) ban of November 1989: 
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Tissues from cattle aged under six months were exempt from the ban on the 
basis that scrapie infectivity had not been found in lambs of this age (BSE 
Inquiry Report, Volume 1: 14).  
 
The decision to exclude tissues from cattle in the first six months of life from the SBO 
ban was reversed in June 1994 when it became apparent that the pathogenesis of BSE 
was dissimilar in significant respects from that of scrapie (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 
1: 137-138). Specifically, a pathogenesis study that had been initiated at the Central 
Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) in December 1991 revealed infectivity in bovine tissues 
(e.g. ileum) earlier than had been expected using the scrapie model (BSE Inquiry Report, 
Volume 2: 121). The rejection of the presumption that it was safe to exclude the tissues 
of calves from the SBO ban displayed all the hallmarks of defeasible presumptions – the 
tentative epistemic commitment to this presumption was eroded as soon as scientists 
obtained evidence which led them to question the plausibility of this presumption. In fact, 
so immediate was the rejection of this presumption and any decisions22 that were based 
on it that the public inquiry team which investigated the handling of the BSE crisis 
described the response as ‘a model of how government ought to handle such an issue’ 
(BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 1: 138). At the same time, however, the defeat of the 
presumption that calf tissues were not infective did not trigger the wholesale rejection of 
every presumption that had been established through analogical reasoning based on 
scrapie. In particular, the decision to give special consideration to the safety of bovine 
tissues in medicinal products was premised on earlier scrapie research which had 
revealed that the parenteral route of transmission was more efficient than the oral route.23 
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If every presumption that had been licensed on the basis of an analogy with scrapie had 
been rejected once it was discovered that calf tissues were infective, the measures that 
were put in place to safeguard medicines and surgical products may well have been 
differently implemented, if they were implemented at all.24 Put quite simply, the 
demonstration of error in the case of one presumptive conclusion – the presumption that 
calf tissues were not infective – had a rather circumscribed impact on scientific inquiry 
into BSE. Presumption was the mechanism whereby this error could be absorbed without 
necessitating any wider destruction of the scientific inquiry into BSE. We will now 
consider how presumption also functioned in the scientific inquiry into BSE by licensing 
decisions in the practical sphere in the absence of complete and certain knowledge. 
 
2.2 Scientific Uncertainty and the Informal Fallacies 
If informal fallacies are particularly well adapted to dealing with the occurrence of error 
during scientific inquiry, they are even more suited to the task of bridging knowledge 
gaps during inquiry. These knowledge gaps were painfully evident to everyone involved 
in the BSE crisis, as can be seen from Mr Cruickshank’s comments in section 1 above. It 
became clear to those whose task it was to contain the spread of the disease in cattle and 
to prevent its transmission to humans that key decisions would have to be taken against a 
wider epistemic context of uncertainty. The only other possible course of action – 
delaying the institution of disease containment measures until a complete knowledge base 
became available – presented an unacceptable level of risk to the health of the population. 
It is against this background of uncertainty, I contend, that certain informal fallacies 
served to advance the inquiry into BSE. Specifically, the presumptive nature of these 
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fallacies licensed decisions of the practical sphere and suggested important research 
directions when relevant knowledge was essentially lacking. In this section, we consider 
two such cases in which this occurred. A more detailed treatment of each case can be 
found in Cummings (2002).    
 
We have already seen how the argument from ignorance formed the mainstay of 
scientific and ministerial pronouncements about the (lack of) risk of BSE to human 
health. Time and time again, consumers were told that that there was no evidence that 
BSE in cattle caused CJD in humans. The implication of this particular statement was, of 
course, that BSE did not cause CJD in humans. Of course, we now know that BSE did 
transmit to humans. Yet, this fact does nothing to diminish the very important role that 
this particular argument played during the BSE crisis. To understand this role, it is 
necessary to consider the type of knowledge that was required to address the question of 
transmission and whether there was a realistic prospect of scientists obtaining that 
knowledge in the short and (foreseeable) longer term. It was known, for example, that 
transmissible spongiform encephalopthies had very long incubation periods.25 On the 
assumption that BSE would exhibit an equally lengthy incubation period in humans, 
scientists were facing a situation in which they would be unable to address the question 
of transmission for many years to come. If disease containment measures were not 
established until BSE-related disease first emerged in humans, the number of people who 
could have become infected in the intervening years was potentially very large indeed. 
Ethical considerations prohibited the type of experimentation that would have directly 
addressed this question. Moreover, the closest knowledge of the transmission of 
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spongiform encephalopathies to humans involved cases that either failed to replicate the 
species barrier that BSE would have to cross in order to infect humans26 or failed to 
replicate the oral route of transmission by means of which BSE would make its way into 
the human population.27 The knowledge base that was needed to address the question of 
the transmission of BSE to humans was thus incomplete in all key respects. 
 
Unable to address the question of BSE transmission to humans directly, scientists had 
little option but to set this question to one side during inquiry. The argument from 
ignorance enabled scientists to disengage from the question of BSE transmission to 
humans and to address other questions for which there was at least a reasonable prospect 
of obtaining answers. By representing the question of transmission to humans as 
disconfirmed (this is, in effect, what the ignorance argument presented in section 2.1 
achieved), there was no longer a requirement on scientists to actively pursue a response 
to it. If the question had remained unconfirmed,28 it would have continued to be subject 
to deliberation by BSE scientists during inquiry. The argument from ignorance had the 
beneficial effect of creating an economical order in which questions were examined 
during the BSE inquiry – where a question was unlikely to be addressed in either the 
short or longer term, it was set to one side to make way for questions that could be 
directly tackled. Quite apart from dismissing the important question of transmission to 
humans, BSE scientists were responding to the uncertainty that confronted them by 
instituting a rational epistemic policy. This policy enabled scientists to concentrate their 
cognitive and technical resources in areas were gains could reasonably be expected to be 
made. To this extent, the argument from ignorance served to facilitate inquiry under 
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conditions that might otherwise have seen it grind to a halt. We will see shortly that this 
facilitative effect is the direct result of the presumptive character of this particular 
argument form.   
 
The question of transmission of BSE to humans was also addressed through another 
argument form that was based upon an analogy with scrapie in sheep. Scientists argued 
that scrapie had not transmitted to humans in 250 years29 and that BSE, which was 
presumed to be similar to scrapie (if not actual scrapie in cattle), would not transmit to 
humans either. In reality, the analogy with scrapie motivated a large number of research 
questions concerning BSE in addition to the question of transmission of the disease to 
humans. Just how many was evident in a paper produced in December 1988 by Mr 
Bradley of the CVL. The paper described five experiments that were already in progress 
at the CVL and which were addressing questions in the areas of epidemiology, clinico-
pathological studies, transmission, molecular biology and molecular genetics. All five 
experiments were premised on earlier research into scrapie in sheep. For example, 
molecular genetic studies were designed ‘to determine any genetic factors involved in 
disease expression in cattle, and to determine whether an equivalent to the sinc or sip 
genes existed in cattle’ (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 2: 187). The sinc and sip genes are 
mice and sheep genes (respectively) that regulate the incubation period of natural and 
experimental scrapie. The list of tissues included in tissue infectivity studies was based 
on ‘extrapolation of data from Hadlow’s studies into scrapie in sheep’ (BSE Inquiry 
Report, Volume 2: 194). By providing a research framework, the analogy with scrapie 
was able to generate many productive lines of inquiry for scientists to pursue when little 
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was known about BSE. Analogical reasoning had the effect of advancing inquiry on 
grounds that held at least some degree of initial plausibility. It thus functioned to bridge 
gaps in scientific knowledge, gaps that would otherwise have adversely affected the 
progress of inquiry. This was possible at all because of the essentially presumptive 
character of the analogical arguments involved. We consider the role of presumptions in 
these arguments below. 
 
The ignorance and analogical arguments that we have examined in this section were 
effective, I am arguing, in bridging gaps in scientific knowledge during the BSE crisis. 
Some examination of the nature of these arguments reveals why this was the case. 
Presumption was the operative epistemic concept in these different arguments. The 
concept of presumption exhibits a distinctly exploratory quality. It licenses investigators 
to pursue courses of action when knowledge is lacking. At the same time, it contains an 
implicit guarantee that should a particular course of action be found to be wanting, our 
tentative commitment to the presumption that warranted this course can be easily eroded. 
The ‘epistemic damage’ of running with a presumption that is ultimately shown to be 
incorrect is thus quite circumscribed. Certainly, it is sufficiently limited in extent not to 
deter an investigator, scientific or otherwise, from becoming committed to future 
presumptions or indeed to the same ‘erroneous’ presumption under different 
circumstances. The ignorance and analogical arguments that were used extensively 
during the BSE inquiry were presumptive reasoning strategies. These arguments 
conferred sufficient warrant on the presumptions that were generated by means of them 
that scientists were able to initiate research studies and implement disease containment 
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measures. Yet, the merely tentative nature of these presumptions meant that when they 
began to appear problematic, scientists were readily able to reject them. Such rejection 
occurred in some cases in which it was warranted (e.g. the rejection of the presumption 
that it was safe to exclude calf tissues from the SBO ban). It is one of the tragedies of the 
BSE affair that it did not take place in every situation in which presumptions based on 
ignorance and analogical arguments were shown to be inadequate. We consider this issue 
in the next section. 
 
2.3 Scientific Dialectic and the Informal Fallacies 
Models of scientific inquiry that are based on disputation are by now well established. 
One of the most prominent proponents of this dialectical approach to scientific 
methodology is Nicholas Rescher. Rescher (1977) proposes a scientific dialectic in 
which: 
 
[C]reative science appears in the light of an adversary procedure, with 
proponents and opponents carrying on a debate to secure the approbation of 
knowledgeable but “disinterested” (i.e., unaligned) parties – often as not the 
rising generation of specialists in the field (111; italics in original). 
 
Within this dialectical approach, presumption and burden of proof is the mechanism by 
means of which evidential considerations in support of scientific theses are effectively 
managed. In this way, the opponent of a scientific thesis must advance grounds why a 
particular claim should not be allowed to stand. Where these grounds are judged to be 
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sufficiently plausible, the opponent has successfully discharged his burden of proof. A 
presumption now exists in favour of his thesis, a presumption which the proponent (now 
opponent) must seek to dislodge through his own advancement of evidence. Where no 
evidence can be advanced against a thesis, or the evidence that is advanced is not judged 
to be sufficiently plausible, the thesis held as a presumption grows in epistemic stature. 
As the participants in inquiry take it in turn to discharge their burden of proof and secure 
a presumption in support of their thesis, the probative standing of theses is steadily 
revealed. 
 
This dialectical model of scientific inquiry is only revealing of the grounds of theses to 
the extent that the participants in inquiry recognize when sufficient plausible evidence 
has been adduced to discharge a burden of proof. Where this burden of proof is 
unreasonably high and the corresponding presumption is excessively difficult to dislodge, 
the dialectical character of inquiry becomes distorted. Presumptions, which are typically 
defeasible, may become resistant to the type of countervailing conditions that would 
normally bring about their rejection. These presumptions can then persist in inquiry 
regardless of the plausibility of the evidence that is adduced against them. Many of the 
ignorance and analogical arguments that facilitated inquiry into BSE in the early stages of 
the epidemic became so deeply entrenched that the presumptions which they generated 
soon assumed the status of unassailable theses. Consider again the analogical argument 
based on scrapie that led scientists to believe that BSE would not transmit to humans. 
Even as evidence began to emerge, for example, that the host range of BSE was not the 
same as that of scrapie, scientists continued to subscribe to the view that BSE was bovine 
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scrapie and that BSE was not transmissible to humans. Officials at the Department of 
Health and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food reported to ministers on 6 
May 1990 that Bristol University had diagnosed a ‘scrapie-like’ spongiform 
encephalopathy in a domestic cat. It was known that scrapie had never been successfully 
transmitted by inoculation to a cat. So this was the first indication that BSE had a 
different host range from scrapie. If BSE could infect a cat, it was entirely possible that it 
could differ from scrapie in one other salient respect. This was the question of BSE 
transmission to humans. 
 
So concerned were scientists and government ministers by this development that their 
immediate response was to attempt to downplay its significance for the question of 
transmission to an anxious public. Essentially, scientists and ministers continued to 
maintain that BSE was scrapie in cattle and, as such, BSE was unlikely to transmit to 
humans. However, in the light of this new evidence, scientists could only continue to 
adopt this position by adhering to a somewhat implausible claim. This was the claim that 
scrapie maybe had transmitted to a cat but that such transmission had gone undetected: 
 
[I]f this could happen to a cat, why should not human beings suffer the same 
fate? Yet it was far too soon to jump to any such conclusion. It was possible 
that there had always been the occasional case of feline spongiform 
encephalopathy (FSE) which had gone unrecognised (BSE Inquiry Report, 
Volume 1: 128). 
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This claim was implausible for two reasons. Firstly, the oral route of transmission was 
known to be less effective than transmission via inoculation. If inoculation had never 
transmitted scrapie to a cat, it was even less likely that transmission would have occurred 
orally. Secondly, scrapie had been in the sheep population for some 250 years. If cats 
were susceptible to scrapie, it is likely that natural transmission to cats would have been 
detected at some stage in this long history of the disease. While the impulse of scientists 
and government ministers to ‘prop up’ the original analogy of BSE to scrapie was an 
understandable one – ministers in particular were concerned to allay the public’s fears 
that BSE would transmit to humans – this was only achieved at the expense of defending 
the non-transmission thesis against plausible counter-evidence, specifically the evidence 
that BSE and scrapie had different host ranges. The non-transmission thesis became a 
‘fossilized’ presumption in the BSE inquiry in that it persisted in immutable form even as 
contrary evidence became available to scientists. What should have been a defeasible 
presumption came to be treated by scientists and government ministers alike as a well 
established fact. By failing to allow plausible counter-evidence to stand against the non-
transmission thesis, scientists and government ministers had effectively subverted the 
dialectical mechanism of presumption and burden of proof in the BSE inquiry. While this 
subversion achieved the short-term goal of convincing the public that beef was safe to 
eat, it had adverse long-term consequences in terms of public distrust of scientific 
pronouncements about risk (Cummings 2005a). 
 
3. SUMMARY 
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Presumption, it emerges, is a highly versatile epistemic concept. Its central characteristic 
of defeasibility means that presumption is ideally suited to the fallible nature of scientific 
inquiry. Even where scientific error does occur and specific presumptions fall by the 
wayside, the immediate effect on inquiry is rather limited. This is because our 
commitment to presumption is as easily broken as it is forged. As well as accommodating 
scientific error, presumption enables scientists to make decisions and pursue courses of 
action in the practical sphere when certain and complete knowledge is essentially lacking. 
Presumption thus has fundamental relevance to scientists who are confronted with newly 
emerging infectious diseases. These scientists must put into action disease containment 
measures when everything from type of pathogen to route(s) of transmission is unknown. 
It is in a context of epistemic uncertainty that the exploratory nature of presumption 
comes to the fore. This concept allows investigators to move forward in inquiry in the 
spirit that nothing ventured is nothing gained (or, perhaps more aptly, the scientist who 
does not venture forth in inquiry is likely to incur significant epistemic and practical 
penalties). Of course, as well as serving inquiry in these important ways, presumption can 
also subvert inquiry. Subversion occurs when the dialectical nature of this concept is 
neglected and plausible counter-evidence is not allowed to stand against presumptions. 
Such presumptions become ‘fossilized’ in inquiry and persist long after reasonable 
counter-evidence has been adduced against them. 
 
All three aspects of presumption were manifested in the reasoning of scientists during the 
BSE crisis. That reasoning contained numerous examples of arguments that logicians 
have traditionally classified as fallacies. Two cases in point were the argument from 
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ignorance and analogical argument. I have argued in this paper that these arguments were 
quite far from being fallacious; indeed, they conferred a number of epistemic gains on the 
inquiry of which they were a part. This was at all possible, I contended, because these 
arguments were presumptive in nature. Yet, the same presumptive forms of reasoning 
that served to advance inquiry under certain conditions – for example, when knowledge 
was lacking – stifled inquiry in other situations. This analysis of these argument forms 
represents a significant departure from traditional accounts of the fallacies. Firstly, the 
traditional distinction between fallacious and non-fallacious arguments is recast in terms 
of presumptions that are applied to the benefit of inquiry in some circumstances and are 
misapplied with adverse consequences for inquiry in other circumstances. Secondly, the 
fallaciousness of any argument becomes a context-sensitive affair and is related 
ultimately to the probative standards that operate in a particular setting. This study thus 
contributes to the ‘pragmatic turn’ that has occurred in fallacy theory in recent years 
(Cummings 2005b: 173). 
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NOTES 
 
1. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a progressive, degenerative disease of the 
brain in cattle. Since its widespread emergence in the 1980s, many thousands of British 
cattle have developed the disease. In early 1993, BSE cases were being reported at a rate 
of around 1,000 a week (BSE Inquiry). BSE subclinical cases have now been linked to 
the development of a new spongiform encephalopathy in humans called new variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (nvCJD). 
 
2. It is arguable that containment was achieved more successfully in the case of SARS 
than in BSE. The outbreak of SARS in 2003 was contained in less than 4 months after its 
initial recognition. However, the outbreak affected 8,098 people, 774 of whom died as a 
result of the infection (Lingappa et al. 2004). The Pathology Department of the UK’s 
Central Veterinary Laboratory first investigated the death of a cow that had developed 
BSE in September 1985 (BSE Inquiry, volume 1). Over 20 years later, cases of the 
disease are still being detected in cattle, although at much lower numbers than at the 
height of the epidemic (see note 1). For example, in 2007 there were 67 confirmed cases 
of BSE in the UK (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2008). Of 
course, given the lengthy incubation period of spongiform encephalopathies, the full 
extent of the human health toll of this disease is still unknown. The UK’s National 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance Unit reports that between 1995 and March 2008, 
there had been 163 deaths caused by new variant CJD (a new form of CJD that is directly 
related to BSE in cattle).  
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 3. It is regrettable that the very scientific disciplines that need to examine how scientists 
make decisions under conditions of uncertainty often devote little or no effort to this 
important reflective exercise. Journals in epidemiology routinely do not publish the type 
of critical and philosophical discussions that this reflection requires. Indeed, the dearth of 
such discussions has prompted the development of a new, online journal. In this way, 
Phillips et al. (2004) state that ‘the desire for new information means that the health 
science literature is overwhelmingly devoted to reporting new findings, leaving little 
opportunity to improve the quality of the science. Epidemiologic Perspectives & 
Innovations was created to provide a forum for efforts to improve the quality of health 
science research and its applications’. Humanities and social scientific disciplines, 
including philosophy, sociology and politics, are very often the only fields in which 
scientific reasoning and decision-making come under any scrutiny. 
 
4. Christakos et al. (2005: 47) describe the deductive and inductive reasoning rules that 
are integral to epidemic modelling. One inductive reasoning rule is the appeal to 
authority, a form of argument that has been frequently discussed in the literature on 
informal fallacies. These investigators also characterize a number of deductive and 
inductive fallacies. They include affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent as 
deductive fallacies, and simple generalization and causal generalization as inductive 
fallacies.   
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5. Christakos et al. (2005: 22) believe that new forms of reasoning, which are not 
subsumed within formal logic, are integral to the efforts of public health scientists to 
respond to uncertainty: ‘The intellectual process leading to the solution of an epidemic 
system should be viewed as the theoretical construct of epistemic cognition…the solution 
of such a system should follow certain rules of reasoning. But these rules are, in the final 
analysis, propositions about one’s epistemic cognition process…the epistemic cognition 
schema is more general than the logical one, because it involves representations and 
procedures (diagrams, visual images, mental metaphors, etc.) that may not be found in 
formal logic’. 
 
6. ‘And what we find in most cases, I think it should be admitted, is as debased, worn-out 
and dogmatic a treatment as could be imagined – incredibly tradition-bound, yet lacking 
in logic and historical sense alike, and almost without connection to anything else in 
modern logic at all. This is the part of his book in which a writer throws away logic and 
keeps his reader’s attention, if at all, only by retailing traditional puns, anecdotes, and 
witless examples of his forbears’ (Hamblin 1970: 12). 
 
7. Or maybe not. As an anonymous reviewer of this paper pointed out, ‘Aristotle, in the 
Topics, considers analogy exactly for the purpose that the author explains in this paper, 
e.g. advancing scientific knowledge. Indeed, at Topics 114b 25, for example, we find a 
topos that corresponds to analogy. What determines the fallaciousness of analogy is the 
degree of resemblance about the two things being compared’.  
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8. Walton (1992) states that ‘[p]resumption is a speech act halfway between assertion and 
(mere) assumption or supposition in argument’ (383). 
 
9. ‘[W]hat will be evidentially sufficient in shifting a burden of proof hinges on the 
inherent seriousness of the contention at issue’ (Rescher 2006: 17). 
 
10. The precautionary principle was developed in the field of environmental health. 
Martuzzi and Bertollini (2004: 44) describe key aspects of this principle, one of which 
links it very directly to the operation of burden of proof: ‘it suggests that the burden of 
proof might be reversed, from “recipients” to prove that an agent or technology is 
harmful to “proponents”, to prove that it is innocuous’.  
 
11. The expression ‘retrospective validation’ is taken from Rescher (1977) who aptly 
describes the epistemic gains that are made by presumptions during inquiry: ‘In the first 
instance…presumptions have a merely provisional and regulative standing, though in the 
final instance they attain a suitable degree of factual-constitutive substantiation’ (1977: 
56; italics in original). The process by means of which presumptions are ‘upgraded’ is 
one of retrospective validation between the putative truths that are the output of inquiry 
and the presumptions that act as input: ‘The logical structure of this justificatory process 
incorporates a feedback loop leading from the truths validated by the inquiry procedure 
back to the initial “merely presumptive” truths, so that the appropriateness of the initial, 
tentative, merely plausible presumptions can be reassessed. This points towards a cyclic 
process of revalidation and cognitive upgrading in the course of which presumptive 
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theses used as inputs for the inquiry procedure come to acquire by gradual stages an 
enhanced epistemic status’ (Rescher 1977: 56-57; italics added). 
 
12. Mill states that ‘[f]or every property…in facts, or in our mode of considering facts, 
which leads us to believe that they are habitually conjoined when they are not, or that 
they are not when in reality they are, there is a corresponding kind of Fallacy; and an 
enumeration of Fallacies would consist in a specification of those properties in facts, and 
those peculiarities in our mode of considering them, which give rise to this erroneous 
opinion (System, Book III, Chapter II, Classification of Fallacies, § 1; italics added). 
 
13. Not only are errors persistent, but they also occur in abundance. In a study of the 
logic of error, Gabbay and Woods (to appear) propose an error abundance thesis in which 
‘beings like us make errors, lots of them’.   
 
14. The eighteen fallacies include ad baculum, ad hominem, ad misericordiam, ad 
populum, ad verecundiam, affirming the consequent, denying the antecedent, amphiboly, 
begging the question, biased statistics, complex question, composition and division, 
faulty analogy, equivocation, hasty generalization, secundum quid, gambler’s and 
ignoratio elenchi. 
 
15. The terms of reference of the public inquiry were ‘[t]o establish and review the 
history of the emergence and identification of BSE and variant CJD in the United 
Kingdom, and of the action taken in response to it up to 20 March 1996; to reach 
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conclusions on the adequacy of that response, taking into account the state of knowledge 
at the time; and to report on these matters to the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food, the Secretary of State for Health and the Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland’ (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 1: xvii). The 16-volume report that 
was produced by the inquiry team is easily the most comprehensive account of the BSE 
crisis that is available. As such, it will provide the factual background to the discussion in 
this paper.  
 
16. SEAC was established to advise the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and 
the Department of Health on matters relating to spongiform encephalopathies. It 
consisted of scientists who had considerable expertise in different aspects of human and 
animal health. Its members were Dr Tyrrell (Director of the Medical Research Council 
Common Cold Unit, Chairman of SEAC), Dr Will (Director of the CJD Surveillance 
Unit), Dr Watson (Director of the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL), 1986-1990), Dr 
Kimberlin (independent consultant in transmissible spongiform encephalopthies), 
Professor Fred Brown (a virologist), Professor Ingrid Allen (a neuropathologist), 
Professor Richard Barlow (pathologist and veterinarian), Mr David Pepper (veterinary 
surgeon), Dr William Hueston (epidemiologist), Professor John Pattison (a medical 
microbiologist), Professor John Collinge (Head of the Neurogenetics Unit at St Mary’s 
Imperial College School of Medicine), Dr Michael Painter (a consultant in communicable 
disease control), Professor Peter Smith (human epidemiologist and statistician), Professor 
Jeff Almond (virologist and immunologist) and Mr Ray Bradley (Head of Pathology 
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Department at the CVL between 1983 and 1995 and coordinator of BSE Research at 
CVL between 1987 and 1995). 
 
17. Similar ‘no evidence’ claims were also repeatedly made by successive British 
government ministers who wished to allay public anxiety that BSE might be 
transmissible to humans. Their motivation for making these claims might well be 
explained by the fact that beef and dairy farming was a hugely profitable sector of 
agriculture in the UK. At the time BSE emerged, the output from milk, fattened cattle and 
calves totaled some £5 billion and comprised nearly 38 per cent of agricultural output in 
the UK (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 1: 23). 
 
18. Discussion of the argument from ignorance can be found in Schedler (1980), Walton 
(1992) and Walton (1996). Although individual characterizations vary, the argument has 
the following form: ‘A is not proven true (false), therefore A may be presumed to be false 
(true)’ (Walton 1992: 385). Applied to the BSE problem, the argument reads as follows: 
It is not proven true that BSE in cattle causes CJD in humans, therefore it may be 
presumed to be false that BSE in cattle causes CJD in humans. 
 
19. The Southwood Working Party was established on the recommendation of Sir Donald 
Acheson (Chief Medical Officer, 1983-1991) ‘to advise on the implications of Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy and matters relating thereto’ (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 
4: 2). The Working Party consisted of experts in human and animal health. Its members 
were Sir Richard Southwood (Chairman of the Working Party and a professor of 
 32
Post-Pri
zoology), Anthony Epstein (a professor of virology), Sir John Walton (a clinical 
neurologist) and Dr William B. Martin (a veterinarian). 
 
20. Walton (1995: 135) characterizes the argument from analogy as follows: ‘Generally, 
case C1 is similar to case C2. A is true (false) in case C1. Therefore A is true (false) in 
case C2’. Applied to the BSE problem, the argument reads as follows: Scrapie in sheep is 
similar to BSE in cattle. Transmission to humans has not occurred in the case of scrapie. 
Therefore, transmission to humans will not occur in the case of BSE. 
 
21. Rescher (1977: 57) remarks that ‘[a]n initial presumption may well drop by the 
wayside in the long run. It is only normal and to be expected that this should happen, 
given the merely tentative probative nature of presumptions’. 
 
22. As soon as health officials became aware of the findings of the pathogenesis study, an 
‘exceptional meeting’ was called on 25 June 1994. The Chief Medical Officer, Dr 
Calman, said that he would be advising ministers that the distal ileum and thymus of 
calves should be proscribed as SBO. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
immediately wrote to the operators of all slaughterhouses, telling them of the proposed 
extension of the SBO ban (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 1: 137-138). 
 
23. The parenteral route of transmission describes the introduction of infection into the 
body via some route other than the mouth or bowel. Bovine-based products injected 
intramuscularly were a possible parenteral route of BSE transmission to humans. Earlier 
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scrapie research indicated that the oral route of transmission was considerably less 
efficient than the parenteral route (Kimberlin and Walker 1989). Also, scrapie research 
that examined different parenteral routes found them to vary in terms of their efficiency 
of transmission (Kimberlin and Walker 1978). Intracerebral and intraspinal routes were 
generally the most efficient, followed by intravenous, intraperitoneal and subcutaneous 
routes. 
 
24. The Committee on the Safety of Medicines issued guidelines to the manufacturers of 
pharmaceuticals on 9/10 March 1989. The public inquiry team described these guidelines 
as ‘the single most important step taken to secure the safety of medicines’ (BSE Inquiry 
Report, Volume 1: 177). The guidelines applied to all licensed products for injection, 
application to the eye or to open wounds. They required that ‘no brain, neural tissue, 
thymus or other lymphoid tissue, placental tissue or cell cultures of bovine material 
should be used in manufacture’ (Volume 1: 177). 
 
25. Iatrogenic transmission of CJD (transmission through some form of medical 
treatment or surgery) has permitted the calculation of specific incubation periods for this 
disease. ‘Central inoculation through neurosurgery, depth electrodes, corneal graft or 
dura mater graft results in disease after a mean incubation period of about 2 yr … 
Peripheral inoculation through human pituitary derived growth hormone (hGH) or 
pituitary derived gonadotrophin (hGnH) results in disease after an incubation period 
range from a minimum of 4 yr to a maximum of at least 30 yr with a mean of around 12 
yr’ (Will 1993: 963). 
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 26. Prior to BSE, human-to-human transmission accounted for all cases of spongiform 
encephalopathies in individuals who did not develop sporadic CJD. Such transmission 
occurred via one of two routes: (1) surgical procedures that either used tissues that had 
been harvested from someone with CJD or that used equipment that had been previously 
used on someone incubating CJD and (2) the consumption of infected human brain 
matter as part of the practice of cannibalism in the Fore people of Papua New Guinea. 
This practice led to the development of kuru, a human transmissible spongiform 
encephalopathy (TSE) that was first described in the 1950s by Zigas and Gajdusek.  
 
27. The only spongiform encephalopathy that has passed to humans via an oral route is 
kuru (see note 26). However, kuru is a human TSE and, as such, it did not have to cross 
the species barrier (unlike BSE). More commonly, parenteral routes of transmission have 
led to the development of spongiform encephalopathies in humans. In this way, CJD has 
transmitted to humans via corneal transplants, stereotactic intracerebral electrodes and 
human growth and gonadotrophin hormones derived from pooled pituitary glands from 
cadavers (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 2: 25).  
 
28. The argument from ignorance achieved the suppression of this possibility. This can 
be seen from the definition of ad ignorantiam advanced by Woods and Walton (1978), in 
which the argument is presented in terms of confirmation theory: ‘the fallacy…consists in 
suppression of the possibility that H [the hypothesis] may be unconfirmed, i.e., the live 
possibility that there are no known data for H is omitted’ (91; italics in original). 
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 29. ‘Extensive retrospective studies together with a review of world literature led to the 
conclusion, published in 1987, that scrapie had never passed to humans despite 
opportunities to do so over the 250 years during which the disease had contaminated 
sheepmeat entering the human food chain’ (BSE Inquiry Report, Volume 2: 67). 
 
 36
Post-Print
 Acknowledgements: 
The author wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the comments of two anonymous 
reviewers of this journal on an earlier version of this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 37
Post-Print
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Aristotle. 1955. On Sophistical Refutations. Translated by E.S. Forster & D.J. Furley. 
London: William Heinemann Ltd. 
 
BSE Inquiry. 2000. Volume 1: Findings and conclusions. London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office. 
 
BSE Inquiry. 2000. Volume 2: Science. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. 
 
BSE Inquiry. 2000. Volume 4: The Southwood working party, 1988-89. London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office. 
 
Christakos, George, Ricardo A. Olea, Marc L. Serre, Hwa-Lung Yu, and Lin-Lin Wang. 
2005. Interdisciplinary public health reasoning and epidemic modelling: The case of 
Black Death. Berlin and London: Springer. 
 
Cummings, Louise. 2000. Petitio principii: The case for non-fallaciousness. Informal 
Logic 20: 1-18. 
 
Cummings, Louise. 2002. Reasoning under uncertainty: The role of two informal 
fallacies in an emerging scientific inquiry. Informal Logic 22: 113-136. 
 
 38
P
st-Print
Cummings, Louise. 2004. Analogical reasoning as a tool of epidemiological 
investigation. Argumentation 18: 427-444. 
 
Cummings, Louise. 2005. Giving science a bad name: Politically and commercially 
motivated fallacies in BSE inquiry. Argumentation 19: 123-143. 
 
Cummings, Louise. 2005b. Pragmatics: A multidisciplinary perspective. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2008) January 2008: Monthly 
summary statistics. London: DEFRA. 
 
Gabbay, Dov M. and John Woods. To appear. Seductions and shortcuts: Fallacies in the 
cognitive economy. North Holland: Elsevier. 
 
Hamblin, Charles L. 1970. Fallacies. London: Methuen. 
 
Kimberlin, Richard H. and C.A. Walker. 1978. Pathogenesis of mouse scrapie: Effect of 
route of inoculation on infectivity titres and dose-response curves. Journal of 
Comparative Pathology 88: 39-47. 
 
Kimberlin, Richard H. and C.A. Walker. 1989. Pathogenesis of scrapie in mice after 
intragastric infection. Virus Research 12: 213-220. 
 39
Post-Print
 Lingappa, Jairam R., L. Clifford McDonald, Patricia Simone, and Umesh D. Parashar. 
2004. Wresting SARS from uncertainty. Emerging Infectious Diseases 10: 167-170. 
 
Martuzzi, Marco and Roberto Bertollini. 2004. The precautionary principle, science and 
human health protection. International Journal of Occupational Medicine and 
Environmental Health 17: 43-46. 
 
Mill, John Stuart. 1843. A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive, being a connected 
view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation. 2 volumes. 
London: Parker. 
 
National Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance Unit. 2008. CJD statistics. 
http://www.cjd.ed.ac.uk/figures.htm. Accessed 26 March 2008.   
 
Phillips, Carl V., Karen J. Goodman, Charles Poole, and Editors. 2004. Lead editorial: 
The need for greater perspective and innovation in epidemiology. Epidemiologic 
Perspectives & Innovations. doi: 10.1186/1742-5573-1-1  
 
Rescher, Nicholas. 1977. Dialectics: A controversy-oriented approach to the theory of 
knowledge. Albany: State University of New York Press.  
 
 40
P
st-Print
Rescher, Nicholas. 2006. Presumption and the practices of tentative cognition. 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Schedler, George. 1980. The argument from ignorance. International Logic Review 11: 
66-71. 
 
Sidgwick, Alfred. 1884. Fallacies. New York: Appleton. 
 
Walton, Douglas N. 1985. Are circular arguments necessarily vicious? American 
Philosophical Quarterly 22: 263-274. 
 
Walton, Douglas N. 1992. Nonfallacious arguments from ignorance. American 
Philosophical Quarterly 29: 381-387. 
 
Walton, Douglas N. 1995. A pragmatic theory of fallacy. Tuscaloosa, AL: The University 
of Alabama Press. 
 
Walton, Douglas N. 1996. Arguments from ignorance. University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press. 
 
Whately, Richard. 1836. Elements of logic. New York: William Jackson. 
 
 41
Post Pr nt
Will, Robert G. 1993. Epidemiology of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. British Medical 
Bulletin 49: 960-970. 
 
Woods, John. 1995. Appeal to force. In Fallacies: Classical and contemporary readings, 
eds. Hans V. Hansen & Robert C. Pinto, 240-250. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press. 
 
Woods, John. 2004. The death of argument: Fallacies in agent-based reasoning. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
 
Woods, John and Douglas N. Walton. 1978. The fallacy of ‘ad ignorantiam’. Dialectica 
32: 87-99.  
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 42
P
st-Print
